In late 2016, Leadership Under Fire (LUF) formed a Think Tank focused on complex, lethal and emergent problem sets that challenge first responders in the United States. In March 2017, the LUF Think Tank hosted a Complex Attack Symposium in Columbus, Ohio. LUF Think Tank participants examined the complex attack threat and identified operational and tactical procedures currently used by the fire service which are misaligned with the complex attack threat. The LUF Think Tank identified opportunities to improve and enhance the American fire service’s response capability to the complex attack threat.

In June of 2020, the LUF Think Tank reconvened to examine vexing challenges that fire departments navigate when conducting fire and emergency operations during periods of civil unrest. The LUF Think Tank endeavored to stimulate a conversation amongst practitioners who have gained significant experience in leading and operating at fires and emergencies during periods of civil unrest in recent weeks and years. Real world experience enabled the working group to collaboratively identify emerging trends and challenges, identify gaps and vulnerabilities in current tactical/operational approaches and subsequently formulate recommendations. The LUF Think Tank Civil Unrest Working Group sought to offer actionable recommendations that align with the asymmetric nature of fire and emergency operations during periods of civil unrest.

This Civil Unrest White Paper is the product of the LUF Think Tank’s collaborative analysis and synthesis. For the purpose of this paper, civil unrest is defined as acts of violence and disorder detrimental to public law and order. It includes acts such as riots, acts of violence, insurrections, unlawful obstructions, or assemblages. Looting and arson are crimes commonly committed during civil unrest. Domestic civil unrest conditions potentially require the employment of federal armed forces or National Guard assets.

This white paper documents the key ideas, concerns and recommendations identified by the LUF Think Tank, particularly those related to the American fire service in urban jurisdictions – areas which are most vulnerable to civil unrest. This paper does not represent the official views of the organizations represented by members of the working group. This paper does, however, embody collective consensus on the part of participants. Overall, participants agreed that the fire service, especially in urban areas, must do more to proactively prepare for operations during periods of civil unrest. The working group is hopeful that this point paper will foster critical conversations at all levels in urban fire departments.

LUF Civil Unrest Working Group Participants and Focus Groups

LUF Civil Unrest Working Group participants included leaders from several uniformed urban fire departments in the United States. Participants presently serve in the ranks of professional fire departments in Chicago, Baltimore, Milwaukee, New York City, Boston, Seattle, Long Beach, CA, and Camden, NJ. LUF Civil Unrest Working Group participants were organized into four functional groups and tasked with identifying the tenets of existing fire service doctrine and policy that demand reconsideration and modification during periods of civil unrest. The areas of functional focus included: 1) Operational Philosophy and Command & Control; 2) Resource Deployment and Employment; 3) Unit Practices and Force Protection; and 4) Personnel Protective Equipment and Special Considerations.

Civil Unrest in the United States in 2020 – A Situational and Socioeconomic Assessment

In the post-Civil Rights era, widespread civil unrest in urban population centers across the United States was an incredibly low frequency and isolated event up until May 2020. The death of George Floyd while in police custody in Minneapolis, Minnesota on May 25, 2020 provoked civil unrest in dozens of cities across the United States. Major U.S. cities witnessed large groups gathering to protest Floyd’s death and air grievances with law enforcement and racial inequality. Social justice demonstrations transpired in cities across the United States, many of them peaceful. In some instances, these peaceful protests tragically manifested into violence and destruction leaving many first responders and citizens alike at increased risk.

Prior to May 2020, only a few U.S. cities in the post-Civil Rights era had navigated extensive civil unrest that challenged its fire department and first responders – Baltimore, Maryland in 2015, Ferguson, Missouri in 2014 and Los Angeles, California in 1992.

America’s current socioeconomic situation at present is ripe for civil unrest. Unemployment is at levels not seen since the Great Depression, perhaps a short-term trend due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Additionally, far reaching public health measures have resulted in limited or restricted access to traditional social and recreational outlets that include athletic events, concerts, public religious observation, dining out, etc. for persons of all socioeconomic means. Furthermore, a disenfranchisement with various levels of government and continued animosity directed at law enforcement exists across the United States, some pre-dating George Floyd’s death. More so, the social services net in many urban areas is reaching a breaking point at a time when cities are struggling to collect adequate revenue to fund government services and programs. The combination of these socioeconomic factors is a recipe for continued civil unrest at a time when digital screen time is at record levels and in an era where information travels at warp speed. The social and political effectiveness of recent civil unrest make it a formidable instrument that will likely pervade in urban settings again, potentially in the months and years ahead. Fire department units must be thoroughly prepared, equipped and staffed to operate at fires and emergencies during periods of civil unrest.

Fire and Emergency Consequence Management During Civil Unrest – National Events

Minneapolis, Minnesota – May – June 2020. The city of Minneapolis reported the property damage and looting that followed the death of George Floyd resulted in $1 billion dollars in destruction. Media sources reported that at least 220 buildings were damaged by vandalism and/or fire.

Chicago, Illinois – May – June 2020. Civil unrest transpired over the course of several nights in late May and early June of 2020 as well as in August. The Chicago Fire Department responded to more than 200 fires in between May 30th and June 1st, many of them in small and large businesses that were looted and then burned. Anecdotally, members of the Chicago Fire Department believed that the fire activity was comparable to fire activity that ensured during the race riots in 1968. Media sources reported that damages from unrest in Chicago exceeded $120 million dollars. Chicago was among 12 major cities that declared curfews in order to prevent looting and vandalism. The Illinois National Guard was deployed to Chicago for the first time in 52 years, the last being the riots in 1968.

New York City, New York – May – June 2020. Civil unrest transpired over the course of several nights in late May and early June 2020. Hundreds of businesses and occupancies were vandalized and looted in Lower and Midtown Manhattan. The SoHo area, one of the city’s most affluent neighborhoods, had more than fifty of its commercial establishments burglarized. A number of buildings were vandalized and looted in the Bronx as well. In two instances, law enforcement members were targeted with Molotov cocktails. New York City imposed its first curfew in 75 years. The City of New York and the FDNY did not disclose the number of fire and emergency responses resulted from unrest, but responder testimony and open source media reports suggested that the FDNY responded to several hundred rubbish fires and that dozens of NYPD vehicles were damaged or destroyed by arson. The City of New York did not disclose the financial damages resulting from unrest.

Baltimore, Maryland – April 2015: Protests started after the funeral service of Freddie Gray on April 27, 2015. The unrest resulted in damage to several hundred businesses, 150 vehicle fires, 60 structure fires and the looting of 27 drugstores. At least twenty police officers were injured. A state of emergency was declared in the city limits of Baltimore and National Guard troops were deployed to assist and augment local law enforcement.

Fire and Emergency Operations during Civil Unrest – An Experiential and Doctrinal Gap

The last time numerous urban American fire departments were navigating widespread civil unrest was during the Civil Rights and Vietnam era in the late 1960s. That era of civil unrest pre-dates the careers of virtually all senior leaders in today’s fire service. The lack of firsthand experience in the senior leadership ranks made recent civil unrest a novel experience for junior and senior leaders alike. In a matter of nights, many young members and officers were able to build a slide deck of mental models informed by real world experience.

In recent years, urban fire departments and law enforcement agencies have devoted considerable effort to developing tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for emergent events to include the active shooter threat and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive (CBRNE) events. It is critical to note that fire and emergency operations during civil unrest are less lethal than emergency operations in support of an active shooter response or a CBRNE event. However, civil unrest operations are perhaps more asymmetric and challenging than a CBRNE event due to the fluidity of the human element. For instance, commanders and responders will be challenged to identify the intrinsic motives and objectives of antagonists and predict where they might migrate to.

Fire and emergency operations during civil unrest demand a graduate level mindset and agile approach that varies greatly from the detailed coordination and limited objective execution that yields effective results at an active shooter event. Like the active shooter and CBRNE events, fire and emergency operations during periods of civil unrest jeopardize the physical and psychological safety of first responders. Though fire and emergency operations in response to recent civil unrest have been relatively low on the lethality scale, the potential exists that extreme unrest could result in a complex attack threat scenario inclusive of direct gunfire, explosive devices, and/or fire as a weapon system (reference LUF Think Tank Complex Attack White Paper for more information).

The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1500 standard states in Section 6-7, Civil Unrest/Terrorism, “Fire departments shall develop and maintain written guidelines that establish a standardized approach to the safety of members at incidents that involve violence, unrest or civil disturbances.” Despite NFPA 1500’s explicit requirement that fire departments maintain a policy for civil unrest, few urban fire departments actually maintain a procedural framework that is actionable and responsive to civil unrest. Members of the LUF Civil Unrest Working Group disagree with the NFPA’s assertion that the guidelines should be standardized, largely because the complexities involved with the response to fires and emergencies during civil unrest are inherently fluid. Operational guidelines that set forth lockstep instructions for leaders and subordinate units as is commonly the case in the fire service are counterproductive to effective action. The working group believes that operational leaders and tactical units benefit far more from a framework that provides pragmatic operational principles and considerations for a civil unrest related response. A framework for fire and emergency operations during civil unrest must afford leaders with latitude and flexibility to exercise judgement.

Operational Command Philosophy in the Civil Unrest Environment – What’s Different?

Many of the assumptions that the American fire service relies upon in the command and control of conventional fire and emergency operations are incongruent with the unique challenges associated with fire and emergency operations during periods of civil unrest. A concerning divide exists because of the prevailing, and largely theoretical, thinking about how leaders plan to mitigate risk during civil unrest and the real-world challenges associated with operating at fires and emergencies during actual civil unrest. Suffice to say, leaders and members will be operating in the gray area and no operational bulletin can wholly address or alleviate the myriad of challenges personnel might encounter.

Many fire departments have applied hazardous materials threat zones to emergency events involving a threat in the form of a hostile human element despite marked differences. Urban fire departments have implemented rigid policies that prohibit firefighters or EMS personnel from operating in a human threat hostile area, i.e. hot or exclusion zones, at any time. Similar policies require fire-rescue personnel to have a law enforcement escort into warm zones. The establishment of tactical control zones is a prudent measure at many emergencies, but a hardline policy is potentially detrimental to tactical action during civil unrest in environments where law enforcement is viewed as the singular adversary by antagonists. What happens in instances where participants are unwilling to cooperate with law enforcement, but then demand that fire-rescue personnel provide critical services? Fire department leaders and personnel are certain to navigate moral dilemmas when responding to fires and emergencies during civil unrest.

Many existing policies regarding fire and emergency operations during civil unrest necessitate the deployment of a joint fire-law enforcement element that possesses the ability to control unrest participants while providing critical fire and EMS services. The conventional wisdom of wait for law enforcement to neutralize potential hostile threats, clear zones, and establish perimeters is well intended, but the temporal consequences yield a competitive disadvantage, particularly in instances where life is in jeopardy. The mere thought of such tactical action in an environment where a physical threat might exist makes many chief fire officers understandably uncomfortable because it falls outside of their circle of technical competence, and because the perceived risks involved exceed the conventional threshold of risk tolerance in the fire service. Both concerns are reasonable, however, they can be proactively addressed through comprehensive training. The most critical decision point for the commander and small-unit leaders revolves around go vs. no-go triggers and criterion. This is a burdensome decision point for operational and tactical leaders at virtually any fire operation. The ambiguity and uncertainty associated with civil unrest only exacerbates the burden of command, particularly in instances where civilians, law abiding or unlawful, and/or first responders are in peril. Actively addressing the mindset of leaders and responders in preparation for fire and emergency operations during civil unrest is imperative.

As a result of a concerted effort to promote firefighter safety, the American fire service has arguably become less tolerant to operational risk in recent years. Many departments have adopted overly conservative risk management models at structural fires with the objective of eliminating risk for fire service personnel. Fire departments that are intolerant to operational risk during ideal occasions are increasingly likely to become even more risk intolerant during periods of civil unrest. In some instances, organizational leaders have implemented a policy of no-response to structural fires during periods of civil unrest. Such a blanket policy is morally bankrupt and jeopardizes the favorable standing that the fire service enjoys with its citizenry, understandably so. Additionally, many non-essential commercial and mercantile occupancies have been shuttered for several months due to pandemic lockdowns making such occupancies a ripe target for both looting and arson during a period when businesses have already suffered significant losses.

Operational models that are overwhelmingly risk averse will potentially exacerbate the public’s dissatisfaction with government magnifying the consequences of arson and fire activity and intensifying the consequences affecting civilian life, critical infrastructure and emergency responders. Commanders and leaders in the fire service must grow increasingly comfortable with risk in a myriad of uncomfortable forms during periods of civil unrest. The mental, emotional, and moral rigors associated with decisive and disciplined actions during periods of civil unrest are exponentially greater than at fires and emergencies during increasingly peaceful and permissive periods. Therefore, training and education curricula must rigorously explore the human factor and mindset of leaders and responders. Furthermore, civil unrest will generate heightened levels of uncertainty, fluidity, and ambiguity with a degree of chaos rarely seen by the most experienced leaders and responders.

Unlike a complex attack or active shooter event which initiate a come as you are response for local first responders, periods of civil unrest are commonly predictable and often advertised. They are not typically spontaneous events. However, like the complex attack event, the incident commander’s ability to employ specialized units will be significantly constrained based on both increased activity and mobility challenges. Additionally, commanders must assume that civil unrest will consist of multiple micro events potentially distributed across geographic zones ranging from a neighborhood to an entire city. Even cities as large as New York City have become accustomed to managing one major event at a time, but civil unrest forces organizations to manage multiple micro fire and emergency events simultaneously rapidly depleting resources, particularly specialized units.

First arriving units and commanders will encounter a considerable volume of uncertainty and ambiguity in the early minutes of operations ranging from identifying the scope of the fire or emergency to crowd sentiments, disposition, and intentions. Unlike conventional fire and emergency operations, uncertainty and ambiguity are likely to remain persistent for the duration of the fire or emergency as crowd and participant behavior are fluid and subject to change. First arriving units and chief officers in urban environments are accustomed to encountering well intended citizens who aide in reducing the commander’s uncertainty at a fire operation as they provide valuable information regarding the life hazard, occupancy, fire location, etc. However, civil unrest groups will potentially aggravate uncertainty as participants seek to add layers of friction to an already dynamic environment. Crowd sentiment and general disposition towards fire department personnel is a critical piece of information and a key element in scene size-up during periods of civil unrest.

The Human Factor at Fire and Emergency Operations During Civil Unrest

Fire and emergency operations during periods of unrest will undoubtedly challenge a fire department’s resource pool. An increase in run activity during civil unrest quickly depletes a well-resourced fire department of available tactical units as well as chief officers. Even more significant than the resource, staffing and logistical demands will be the human factors forces applied to individual leaders and personnel who are responding to fires and emergencies. The conduct of fire and emergency operations during periods of civil unrest generates emotional, psychological, and physiological stress that exceeds the high levels normally encountered during conventional fire and emergency operations. Furthermore, past and recent real-world events suggest that operations during civil unrest have the potential to last for several days or even weeks, taxing fire departments and their members physically, psychologically, and morally. It is imperative that leaders proactively address the psychological and physiological response to stress to enhance the preparation and operational conduct of leaders and responders as well as to foster resilience.

The Imperative of the Moral High Ground When Operating During Civil Unrest

Civil unrest in recent weeks and months has highlighted civic and social disenfranchisement with law enforcement, government institutions and political establishments. An overwhelming amount of unrest in recent weeks and years has been primarily focused on dissatisfaction with law enforcement. Fire and emergency operations during civil unrest present a perplexing psycho-social challenge because the turmoil potentially exploits an interagency relationship of solidarity between the fire service and law enforcement.

The fire service has largely continued to enjoy a favorable status with urban citizens to include those who harbor hostile sentiment towards law enforcement. Though urban fire departments have been involved in considerable civil unrest related response activity, there have been few documented instances of fire department personnel being physically threatened or harmed. The working group attributes this trend to the fact that American citizenry universally holds the fire service in the highest regard. This time-honored relationship rooted in mutual trust yields a force protection multiplier for fire department personnel in the sense that physical threats are generally limited to those which are environmental and mechanical in nature and not human, terrorism being an exception. The fire service’s neutrality and steadfast impartiality yields fire department personnel a favorable advantage as tactical units are rarely deterred from action and infrequently threatened by civil unrest antagonists.

Fire department personnel operating during periods of unrest find themselves in a difficult position of being professionally compelled to provide fire and emergency services while maintaining an impartial position on demonstrations, riots and violence targeted at law enforcement, government, and political establishments. It is imperative that fire department personnel remain vigilant yet maintain a stoic and impartial demeanor while continuing to serve all in distress during periods of civil unrest. This is undoubtedly a challenging endeavor, particularly in scenarios where fire department personnel are likely to encounter individuals and groups conducting actions that are immoral, unlawful, and detestable. It is imperative for fire department personnel to maintain the moral high ground regardless of how abhorrent antagonist behavior might be. Individual or unit level lapses in discipline, restraint or impartiality could prove problematic for a fire department’s image and subsequently jeopardize the relative operational safety that fire department personnel enjoy in contrast to members of law enforcement. The consequences of a momentary lapse in discipline or judgment are exponential due to the proliferation of social media.

Substantive Guidance on Self-Defense and Unit Defense is Critical

Though instances of fire department personnel being threatened or harmed have been isolated to date, it is critical that the senior leadership of fire departments provide uniformed personnel with guidance on the right to self and unit defense. American fire service leaders commonly pride themselves on prioritizing the operational safety of their members. Yet, many uniformed members in urban fire departments have received little to no guidance on appropriate measures or actions if personnel find themselves physically threatened or harmed while remote from law enforcement. While it is critical that fire department personnel refrain from conducting law enforcement activities, it is conceivable that fire department personnel might find themselves threatened or harmed while geographically remote or physically isolated from law enforcement.

Members of this working group ardently agreed that professional duty does not eliminate a Constitutional and legal right to self-defense. There are of course numerous ways in which a firefighter or firefighters might employ PPE or unit equipment to neutralize a threat in an instance where personnel perceive a grave threat to a uniformed member or unit. Any of these courses of action are of course a last resort and some are more practical, humane, and feasible under stress than others. Senior leaders that adopt the default position that fire department personnel are to be solely reliant on law enforcement for force protection are doing their personnel a great disservice. Senior leaders must address force protection dilemmas and concerns in concert with legal advisors. It is of critical importance for senior leaders to issue substantive guidance that is consistent with the fire department’s image, explicit mission, and commitment to personnel safety. Thought provoking conversations between field commanders, company officers and personnel that explore the sorts of unnerving force protection dilemmas that members and units might encounter must ensue.

Vulnerabilities Resulting from Conventional Fire Department Practices that Degrade the Operational Capability Set During Periods of Civil Unrest

The working group identified the following operational vulnerabilities in the urban fire service’s conventional capability set as it relates to conducting fire and emergency operations during periods of civil unrest:

Vulnerability #1: Reliance on Law Enforcement in a Civil Unrest Environment:

Fire department personnel and EMS providers have been conditioned and trained to operate strictly in conjunction with law enforcement in response to active shooter events, CBRNE events and those involving potentially hostile persons.

Recommendation #1:

Fire and emergency operations during civil unrest may require that fire department units operate independently of law enforcement. This approach is counter to the combined fire department–law enforcement model that is essential to mission success in an active shooter threat or CBRNE environment. The deployment of fire department units independent of a law enforcement escort may be due to a shortage of law enforcement assets. Law enforcement’s operational priorities may vary considerably from the fire department’s during civil unrest. It is unreasonable to presume that law enforcement will have sufficient mobile resources to support convoy type movement of fire department units. Additionally, fire department units have reported experiencing improved mobility and reception by unrest participants when operating independent of law enforcement. The requirement for law enforcement should be determined by climate and atmospherics – it is not an absolute.

Fire department leaders and responders may also be faced with an operational dilemma where a group requests fire department intervention in a setting where law enforcement is prohibited or unwelcome. The complexity of the operational environment and associated risks necessitates that fire and law enforcement activity are closely coordinated when actions transpire in parallel, but a mandate for joint execution may be unsupportable and counterproductive.

Vulnerability #2: Dispatch and Tracking of Tactical Units:

Tactical suppression units are likely to find themselves inundated with fires ranging from rubbish to vehicles to structural fires, commonly on the same block or street. Experience has shown conditions have required units to self-deploy from fire to fire and that units have had difficulty maintaining radio contact with the dispatcher due to excessive activity.

Recommendation #2:

The establishment of an Area Command ensures that all tactical units are accounted for, maintain radio contact and that all fire activity is tracked in real time. An Area Command element may transition from initially being a mobile asset to establishing a fixed Area Command Post in the vicinity of a geographic zone where fire activity requires numerous tactical units at several fires. The Area Command element reduces the need for fire department dispatchers to maintain radio contact with and track all units extinguishing minor fire activity, rubbish fires, vehicle fires, etc. Furthermore, an increase in structural fire activity in various neighborhoods or geographic zones may require the Area Command Element to track and manage multiple structural fires.

Vulnerability #3: Deployment of Single Suppression Units

Engine and ladder companies are commonly deployed independently and operate by themselves at a myriad of fires and emergencies which are minor in nature, such as EMS, rubbish fires, automobile fires, utility emergencies, etc. This practice is sufficient during conventional operations, but much less so during civil unrest. Single units that respond and operate independently are increasingly vulnerable and susceptible to the effects of civil disorder. Engine companies are the main effort in the extinguishment of rubbish and vehicle fires. Ladder companies are of limited value when responding to fires without an engine company during civil unrest.

Recommendation #3:

The practice of single unit responses should be suspended during civil unrest. Additionally, all ladder companies which are quartered independently should be quartered with an engine company. A partnered ladder company provides overwatch and security while the engine extinguishes fires. Company officers in command of tactical units during civil unrest preferred the depth afforded by having a second unit. Company officers reported the added value of having a second company officer on scene. Additionally, a second tactical unit provides mobile redundancy for personnel in the event that a unit is disabled or severely damaged and immobile.

Vulnerability #4: Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

Urban fire officers and firefighters have little to no access to armor/ballistic PPE or even a passive means of force protection greatly jeopardizing their survivability in a civil unrest environment where individuals might encounter a hostile threat. Many fire and EMS agencies have taken measures to equip a limited number of personnel with additional PPE to reduce vulnerability to ballistic effects.

Recommendation #4:

Much of the body armor that fire departments have procured in recent years for EMS providers and designated personnel provides adequate protection against small arms fire and limited protection to key organs against blast effects. Many urban fire departments have made a proactive move to try and outfit a small number of personnel with ballistic protection. However, this only leaves a limited number of personnel who are equipped to operate in a ballistic threat environment. Furthermore, the American fire service must explore a protective posture that affords both thermal and ballistic protection. Fire service personnel equipped with ballistic vests are assets at an active shooter event but are of diminished value and pose liabilities in an operational environment where a thermal and ballistic threat exists concurrently.

Vulnerability #5: Command and Resource Deployment Philosophies

The conventional thought process behind resource deployment in public safety organizations is to always request more resources when in doubt. This is particularly true in the American fire service where incident commanders are commonly encouraged to transmit greater alarms, bringing more resources to the scene. This approach often leaves jurisdictions incapable of managing multiple major events and in some instances triggers the response of mutual aid units from suburban or surrounding jurisdictions. This practice might be detrimental to effective operations during civil unrest particularly if incoming units lack the training, equipment and/or mindset to operate in the civil disturbance area. Incoming units that are unprepared or ill-equipped to perform tasks could present an operational liability.

Recommendation #5:

Fire departments must be capable of deploying multiple area commanders and many tactical units to numerous geographic zones during periods of unprecedented activity. Command staffs must ensure that both area and subordinate on-scene commanders have enough units at their disposal to effectively mitigate and contain fire activity while refraining from deploying units that would be subjected to increased exposure to risk while standing fast in the street. Proactive fireground commanders customarily special call and maintain units in reserve at fires. This practice should be modified during civil unrest and the reserve force should be managed by the area commander, not the fireground commander. On-scene commanders must exercise restraint in special calling additional units or transmitting additional alarms unless the additional resources are critical. All fire department reserve apparatus should be staffed and mobilized. Additionally, all non-essential fire department activities should be suspended and the practice of dispatching units to non-emergency service-related calls (water leaks, lockouts, etc.) should be temporarily halted in order to maximize unit availability.

Vulnerability #6: Operational Control and Boundary Measures:

Command and control models often advocate geographic and operational control measures and zoning, i.e. hot, warm, cold, which are appropriate for hazardous materials incidents and most CBRNE events. This approach, however, is potentially inadequate for the civil unrest environment given its fluidity. The arbitrary implementation of conventional zones associated with hazardous materials events during civil unrest will likely prove not only insufficient, but counterproductive to disciplined, effective and responsive action.

Recommendation #6:

It is paramount for incident commanders and area commanders to establish operational zones, control measures, and boundaries. These zones and boundaries must be determined by the level of fire and emergency activity, respective levels of unrest and subsequent activity, and most importantly the availability of tactical units and deployment of water in support of firefighting operations. Additionally, the assignment of a small fire department liaison team to police department operations and intelligence cells (or fusion centers) will aide fire department staff and area commanders with establishing operational zones and postures based on risk factors and challenges associated with unrest activity.

Vulnerability #7: Security of Fire Department Apparatus and Quarters

Fire department personnel are accustomed to leaving both quarters and apparatus unmanned when personnel are operating at fires and emergencies. This practice leaves fire department facilities, apparatus, and equipment susceptible to siege and damage. Recent unrest has suggested that firehouses which are co-located with police precincts are most vulnerable to unlawful entry and damage. The standard practice of leaving fire department apparatus unattended at fires leaves apparatus susceptible to being stolen and operated by antagonists.

Recommendation #7:

Fire department command staff must implement measures that safeguard the physical security of quarters while units are operating at fires and emergencies. Security measures might consist of active (physical), passive (video surveillance), or ideally a hybrid model consisting of a plan that deters antagonists from attempting to enter fire department facilities. Tactical unit leaders must ensure that apparatus is not left unattended when units are operating at alarms. Departments must augment staffing to optimal levels to ensure that tactical leaders have adequate personnel strength.

Recommended Actions for Strategic Leaders in Urban Fire Departments

Fire departments have a moral and professional responsibility to operate effectively at fires and emergencies during periods of civil unrest and to perform mission-critical tasks. The following recommendations from the LUF Civil Unrest Working Group are best suited for evaluation by organizational leaders in urban fire departments:

1. Develop a comprehensive and strategic concept of operations that is responsive to the challenges presented specifically during civil unrest. The concept must effectively address tactical training, force protection and security, logistics, personal protective equipment, resource deployment and the operational employment of fire department resources. The concept of operations must provide a framework for organizational actions which are responsive to the challenges that units will navigate while conducting fire suppression, technical rescue, emergency medical services, and while mitigating public utility and infrastructure emergencies. A rigorous planning process (with a red team component) will enhance the attainment of life-safety (civilian and first responder), property and infrastructure protection and incident stabilization objectives.
2. Develop substantive relationships with the U.S. military to gain a better understanding of contemporary tactics, techniques, and procedures employed during civil unrest. Many current and former military leaders gained real-world subject matter expertise on support and stability operations during periods of civil unrest in Iraq’s major cities. Additionally, strategic public safety leaders would benefit from gaining an understanding of the operational challenges and imperatives associated with “three-block war concept” developed by General Charles Krulak, USMC (Ret). A substantive relationship with the military is exclusively for information sharing only but would prove mutually beneficial to the fire service and military. The fire service stands to learn a great deal about stability operations and the U.S. military stands to gain a considerable amount of technical and tactical knowledge from the American fire service about fire behavior, building construction in urban environments, technical rescue and collapse operations.
3. Explore organizational and PPE ensembles that afford fire officers and firefighters enhanced protection during civil unrest without compromising their ability to perform essential functions under even greater physiological stress. PPE ensembles should continue to provide some degree of thermal and respiratory protection while also providing protection against direct fire weapon effects, fragmentation, and projectiles. PPE needs to be available for immediate use and readily available on primary apparatus, not cached at locations waiting to be delivered via special apparatus. Additionally, the PPE assigned to fire department personnel should look distinctly different than that worn by law enforcement of military. American fire service leaders should advocate for the development of a progressive ensemble that provides protection against thermal, ballistic and fragmentation hazards, e.g. not the donning of a bunker coat over a ballistic vest. Additionally, the practice of supplying all operational units with tourniquets and hemostatic agents has saved considerable lives in recent years and will continue to save both civilians and first responders. Such rapid measures are essential when operating during civil unrest.
4. Develop a command and control philosophy for civil unrest that appropriately accounts for the deployment and employment of fire department resources in a civil disturbance area. A mission-oriented and limited exposure command philosophy is likely to generate a resource deployment model and a risk management framework that will vary significantly from those used for conventional structural fires and emergencies. Furthermore, command and resource deployment models must allocate a robust reserve, with a command and control component, that can respond to secondary or tertiary events, or reinforce units and personnel operating at an initial event.
5. Develop a training framework for fire officers and firefighters who will potentially operate at fires and emergencies during civil unrest. Existing national, regional, and local training programs fail to impart basic knowledge or even awareness about fire and emergency operations during civil unrest. They do not equip fire service officers and personnel with the necessary tactical skills to function optimally in a civil disturbance area while reducing their vulnerability to injury and death. Training frameworks should include scenario based hands-on training evolutions that require tactical acumen as well soft skills which are paramount to operating effectively during periods of civil unrest. It is imperative for senior leaders to articulate the need for comprehensive civil unrest training, equipment, and staffing to elected officials and fiscal managers. A failure to properly prepare fire department personnel for such events threatens to exacerbate the civil, social, and economic consequences of unrest.

Conclusion

The social and political effectiveness of recent civil unrest make it a formidable instrument that will likely pervade in urban settings again, potentially in the months and years ahead. Fire department units must be thoroughly prepared, equipped, and staffed to operate at fires and emergencies during periods of civil unrest. Many of the assumptions that the American fire service relies upon in the command and control of conventional fire and emergency operations are incongruent with the unique challenges associated with fire and emergency operations during periods of civil unrest. LUF Thank Tank participants ardently agreed that the fire service, especially in urban areas, must do more to proactively prepare for operations during periods of civil unrest.

In the aftermath of unrest, leaders at all levels must facilitate opportunities for meaningful review and critique of the efficacy of operational and tactical policies while also highlighting vulnerabilities and deficiencies. Operational commanders and small unit leaders who operated at fires and emergencies are best suited to shape the creation and/or revision of operational and tactical frameworks. These leaders will ensure that operational policy and tactical principles are grounded not in theory, but reality.

Fire department leaders, staffs and tactical units must embrace the fluidity, uncertainty, and friction that is certain to accompany fire and emergency operations during periods of civil unrest. Operational commanders and small unit leaders must be decisive, adaptive, and willing to adjust tactics and unit level procedures in the temporary absence of communications with higher headquarters. Fire department staff, area commanders and chief officers must provide guidance and support to subordinate units while consistently affording small unit leaders the latitude to exercise initiative and maintain a bias for action in a fashion that is consistent with the explicit mission of the American fire service.