Complex Attack Think Tank participants included leaders from uniformed urban fire and law enforcement agencies, the U.S. military, as well as representatives from the International Association of Firefighters (IAFF) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS). More specifically, Complex Attack Think Tank participants presently serve in the ranks of professional fire departments in Chicago, Baltimore, Milwaukee, Philadelphia, Iowa City, Boston and New York.

Also participating were senior executive law enforcement and military leaders with extensive operational experience in both major cities and operational campaigns abroad. These senior leaders delivered presentations on emergent trends in urban terrorism, threat analysis for first responders and the changing nature of emergency response to terrorism. A senior member of the U.S. military’s special operations command also delivered a presentation that explored a paradigm shift in thinking, training and operating that has enhanced the ability of special operators to effectively operate in a complex attack environment where fire is used as a weapon system.

Complex Attack Think Tank participants were organized into five functional groups and tasked with identifying deficiencies in current tactical frameworks that served to develop recommendations specific to enhancing tactical capabilities for a complex attack. The areas of functional focus included: command and control; force protection and PPE; threat analysis; fire rescue tactics; and tactical jointness. Each focus group included a uniformed leader from law enforcement and the fire service as well as a knowledgeable combat leader with tactical experience in urban combat.

Complex Attack Think Tank participants included:

Jason Brezler, FDNY/USMC
Paul Conway, Milwaukee Fire Department (Ret.)
Recordo Demetrius, FDNY/USMC
Matt Golsteyn, IAFF
Sid Heal, LA County Sheriffs (Ret.)/USMC (Ret.)
Nick Kalt, Long Beach (CA) Fire Department/USMC (Ret.)
James McNamara, FDNY
Demir Miljkovic, Urbandale (IA) Fire Department
Steven Mitchell, Boston Fire Department
Patrick Maloney, Chicago Fire Department
Eric Nurnberg, Iowa City Fire Department
Kevin Preston, Boston Fire Department/USAF
Thomas Richardson, FDNY
Devon Richio, Philadelphia Fire Department
Joseph Rodrigues, USMC
James Roussell, Chicago Police Department (Ret.)/USMC(Ret.)
Wally Wannall, GRA Maven/US Army (Ret.)
Andrew Whitehead, Baltimore City Fire Department

Understanding the Complex Attack Threat – Trends and Operational Practices 

Though it has been an incredibly low frequency event in the U.S. and Western world, the overwhelming effectiveness of the complex attack against both first responders and military units in global urban settings demands attention. The impact of such events generates emotional, psychological, structural and fiscal effects that far exceed other major fire and emergency events that occur in major cities on a more frequent basis.

The federal government, most notably DHS, state and regional agencies, and local jurisdictions have made a tremendous investment into enhancing emergency response to terrorist events post-September 11, 2001. This extensive effort has facilitated greater dialogue and coordination at the executive levels and between local and regional agencies. Operational level functions, such as unified command and control and interoperable communications networks, have improved drastically. In recent years, law enforcement agencies and fire departments have devoted considerable attention to developing tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) for the active shooter threat which is largely a law enforcement centric event minus casualty care and removal. It is critical to note that a complex attack is far more lethal, challenging and asymmetric than an active shooter event. The American fire service should be applauded for its efforts to not only develop a framework of action for active shooter events, but also for its proven ability to execute at real-world events. The harsh reality is that the complex attack threat demands a graduate level mindset that greatly surpasses the detailed coordination, preparation and execution that yields effective results at an active shooter event.

In addition to increased attention to the active shooter threat, public safety organizations have proactively prepared for response to events involving energetic materials and IED’s. However, there has been much less effort invested into enhancing tactical capabilities for a complex attack where first responders and civilians are threatened by direct gunfire, explosives and fire as a weapon system. Current tactical thinking, procedures, equipment and the absence of tactical jointness leave first responders highly vulnerable to the effects of a bona fide complex attack, and consequently unprepared to fulfill their mission of protecting civilian life and infrastructure. The amount of tactical joint integration and coordination requisite for a complex attack does not currently exist. The current operational mindset, tactics, procedures and equipment are inadequate for generating favorable results in terms of protecting life and property while reducing risk to first responders at complex attack events. The best technology and equipment are of little value if fire and law enforcement agencies are unable to operate cohesively.

The modern-fire tactics, advocated by Underwriter Laboratories (UL) and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), have been a source of considerable debate in the American fire service, particularly in vertical urban settings such as New York City and Chicago. The transitional attack, principally the practice of employing hose lines from the exterior of a building prior to the initiation of an interior attack provides operational commanders with a viable means of getting water on the fire in instances where fire is evident, or the main body is in a location adjacent to an exterior wall with a window at a complex attack event. Though this indirect approach may facilitate the application of water from the exterior, it does not reduce the necessity to ventilate the structure vertically. Vertical ventilation will be critical to both responder efficacy and civilian life safety at a complex attack operation where smoke is accumulating in the stairwells and throughout the building.

The Complex Attack Threat – Critical and False Assumptions 

For the purpose of think tank discourse and this initial White Paper, a complex attack is assumed to involve an adversary who aggressively employs direct gunfire and/or incendiary explosives and fire as a weapon system. Fire and smoke can either be intentionally used as a weapon to inflict harm or may be the byproduct of events involving energetic materials and improvised explosives, especially when the materials and explosives used are homemade (low-order as opposed to high-order military or commercial grade). Furthermore, such an event assumes to generate life-threating injuries to the civilian populace and potentially first-arriving first responders.

Aside from the consequences of a catastrophic radiological event, the complex attack with the threat of direct gunfire, explosive devices and fire as a weapon system poses the most lethal threat to not only the civilian populace and critical infrastructure, but the life safety of first responders. Operational assumptions based on past and recent real-world events are that the window of carnage will be 60 minutes in duration. A true complex attack will instigate a “come as you are” response for local first responders. The incident commander’s ability to employ local specialized units, regional units and national assets will be significantly constrained based on both time and space. Additionally, commanders must assume that a complex attack will consist of multiple attacks potentially distributed across an urban or geographic zone. Even cities as large as New York have become accustomed to managing one major event at a time, but a true complex attack will force agencies to manage multiple complex events simultaneously rapidly limiting resources, particularly specialized resources. Furthermore, first arriving units and commanders will encounter a considerable volume of uncertainty and ambiguity in the early minutes of the operation. First arriving units and the initial incident commander might not even have the luxury of knowing that they are operating at a terrorist event until the situation develops. Thus, existing operational decision-making models and risk-management models that are predicated on the knowledge of a terrorist attack are assumed to be of less value to first arriving units and commanders.

The aforementioned assumptions are incongruent with many of the assumptions that the American fire service has relied upon in establishing command and control guidelines for operations at terrorist attacks. A concerning divide exists as a result of the prevailing (and largely theoretical) thinking about how leaders plan to mitigate a complex attack and the real-world challenges associated with a complex attack. The complex attack presents a unique threat because it quickly exploits the capability set of both fire service resources and law enforcement resources. Many fire departments have adopted hazmat threat zones (i.e. hot, warm, cold) while prohibiting the deployment of fire suppression personnel into the “hot zone.” The establishment of tactical control zones is a prudent measure but an “always or never” policy is potentially detrimental to tactical action.

Unlike an active shooter threat, law enforcement will be incapable of independently mitigating the threat in instances where there is a medium to heavy fire condition and/or smoke condition. The conventional wisdom of “wait for law enforcement to neutralize armed threats; remain on the outer perimeter until law enforcement secures the engagement area; cordon off all potential IED’s; request additional resources” will cultivate a reluctance to act and yield the adversary an even greater competitive advantage. A bona fide complex attack will likely require the deployment of joint fire-law enforcement tactical teams that possess the ability to employ automatic weapons against an armed operative but also navigate a smoke condition and/or suppress fire in an environment that is immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH). The mere thought of such tactical action commonly makes chief fire officers and other public safety leaders uncomfortable because it falls outside of their circle of technical competence and because the perceived risks involved exceed the conventional threshold of risk tolerance in the fire service. Both concerns are reasonable, however, they can be proactively addressed through comprehensive training and education. Actively addressing the mindset of leaders and responders in preparation for response to a complex attack operation is imperative.

The most critical decision point for the commander and small-unit leaders revolves around “go vs. no-go” triggers and criterion. This is commonly a burdensome decision point for operational and tactical leaders, but the lethal nature of the complex attack will only exacerbate the burden of command, particularly in instances where a large number of innocent civilians and/or first-arriving first responders are in peril. As a result of a concerted effort to promote firefighter safety, the American fire service has arguably become less tolerant to risk in recent years. Many departments have adopted overly conservative risk management models at structural fires with the objective of eliminating risk for fire service personnel.

Operational models that are entirely risk averse will greatly aid the adversary and intensify the consequences affecting the civilian life hazard, critical infrastructure and most likely first arriving emergency responders. Personal philosophies aside, commanders and leaders in the fire service must grow increasingly comfortable with risk at a complex attack event. The mental, emotional and moral rigors associated with decisive yet disciplined action in a complex threat environment are exponentially greater than at conventional fires and emergencies. Therefore, training and education curriculum must rigorously explore the human factor and mindset. Such an event will generate unprecedented levels of uncertainty and fluidity while creating a degree of lethality and chaos rarely seen by the most experienced first responders. It is imperative that leaders and personnel receive in-depth training in the psychological and physiological response to stress in an effort to enhance their preparation.

The Complex Attack Threat – Global Events 

Beslan. On September 1, 2004, 32 armed militants, linked to a Chechen separatist insurgency, executed a violent take-over of a school in North Ossetia, Russia. The attackers herded more than 1,000 hostages into a gymnasium rigged with explosives, where they were deprived of food and water for three days. On September 3rd, explosions in the school prompted a counter-offensive by Russian special forces. A fierce battle ensued: a hail of gunfire, explosions, and a fire in the gymnasium that killed more than 300 people – the majority of them, children (some fatalities also occurred during the initial attack). This complex attack environment was notable for its combined threats (gunfire, explosives, and structural fire), the emotional factor that children were directly targeted, and the fact that the majority of the fatalities occurred during the tactical response.

Mumbai. On November 26, 2008, 10 assailants from the Pakistan based terror group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) arrived by cargo vessel in Mumbai, India and proceeded to carry out a precise and prolonged attack at 12 separate locations throughout the city. The attack targeted facilities and locations that were considered “soft targets” utilizing assault rifles, small arms and various types of explosives. At the Taj Hotel, attackers entered a nearby café, killing 10 people in a hail of gun fire then proceeded to the hotel lobby where they continued to fire their weapons. They then retreated to the upper floors of the hotel where they set fires at multiple locations in an effort to confuse and impede government commandos. The siege lasted 60 hours before coming to an end. The attack resulted in the death of 172 people and was said to be especially significant because of its complexity, which brought to light the limitations of municipal fire and emergency services when operating in a complex attack environment.

Benghazi. At approximately 2140 on September 11, 2012, dozens of attackers struck the U.S. Temporary Mission Facility in Benghazi, Libya in a complex attack utilizing small arms, rocket propelled grenades and fire as a weapon. Over the course of the attack, at least 60 different attackers entered the U.S. compound, moving unimpeded and entering and exiting buildings at will. After entering the Mission facility, combatants used flammable liquids to set fire to the guard house and main facility building housing Ambassador Christopher Stevens, Sean Smith and a State Department Diplomatic Security (DS) Agent. Within 19 minutes of the start of the attack, thick smoke filled the building, forcing Ambassador Stevens, Sean Smith and the DS Agent to evacuate their safe room. During their movement to an egress point, the trio became separated, with only the DS Agent reaching relative safety. Sean Smith was found deceased shortly after the arrival of a quick reaction force (QRF) comprised of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) security officers from a nearby CIA Annex. Ambassador Stevens’ remains were not recovered by American personnel on site due to fire, heat and smoke conditions. After action reports were recently declassified and suggest that the intensity of the small arms and rocket propelled grenade fire in conjunction with heavy structural fire conditions adversely affected the rescue and recovery of trapped individuals during the attack.

Burkina Faso. On January 15, 2016, operatives affiliated with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb attacked a luxury hotel frequented by foreigners in Burkina Faso’s capital, seizing hostages and killing others. They then defended their position as dozens of security forces attempted a counterattack hours later. Operatives initiated the attack with at least one explosion outside the hotel resulting in a number of vehicle fires. Subsequently, they employed rifle fire and maneuvered inside the hotel – where they began taking hostages. The attackers also fired on the restaurant across from the hotel before setting it on fire. The attack reportedly left 30 civilians dead and several dozen seriously wounded. This event presented significant challenges to first responders and military elements due to the sophistication and complexity of the attack.

Deficiencies that Presently Degrade the Fire Service’s Operational Readiness 

The LUF Complex Attack Think Tank identified the following deficiencies in the fire service’s capability set as it relates to conducting fire-rescue operations at a complex attack:

1. Absence of tactical jointness:
The inability for fire department and law enforcement units to operate jointly at the tactical level. A number of fire department-based emergency medical services (EMS) providers have been trained and equipped to operate in conjunction with law enforcement in response to active shooter events. Additionally, several urban fire departments maintain a tactical EMS capability set in which fire department EMS providers augment special operations law enforcement elements, but this is a low-density capability set.

2. Inadequate personal protective equipment (PPE) to operate in the complex attack threat environment:
Inadequate PPE for members of the fire service and law enforcement. Urban fire officers and firefighters have little to no access to armor/ballistic PPE or even a passive means of force protection greatly jeopardizing their survivability when operating at a complex attack. Conversely, law enforcement officers have armor/ballistic PPE as well as the means to proactively protect themselves with suppressive gunfire, but they lack PPE that offers protection from thermal and respiratory hazards. Many fire and law enforcement agencies have taken measures to equip a limited number of personnel with additional PPE to reduce vulnerability to ballistic effects. Much of the body armor that fire departments have procured in recent years for EMS providers and designated personnel provides adequate protection against small arms fire but does not provide key organs adequate protection against blast effects. The primary concern, however, is that only a limited number of personnel will be able to operate in the threat environment.

3. Inappropriate command and resource deployment philosophies:
The conventional thought process behind resource deployment in public safety organizations is to always request more resources when in doubt. This is particularly true in the American fire service where incident commanders are commonly encouraged to transmit greater alarms, bringing more resources. This approach often leaves jurisdictions incapable of managing multiple major events. Furthermore, this practice is detrimental to effective operations at a complex attack event, particularly if incoming units lack the training, equipment and/or mindset to operate in the engagement area. Incoming units that are unprepared or ill-equipped to perform tasks are not merely spectators but are lucrative targets.

4. A lack of detailed planning that addresses joint operational law enforcement-fire department movement and staging in order to enhance coordination and force protection prior to conducting tactical actions.

5. Insufficient operational control and boundary measures:
Command and control models often advocate geographic and operational control measures and zoning (i.e. hot, warm, cold) which are appropriate for hazardous materials incidents. This approach, however, is insufficient for an urban battlespace. It is paramount for incident commanders and their staffs to establish operational control measures and zones. These control measures, zones and operational boundaries must be dictated by the scope of the threat(s), associated hazards (life, infrastructure, etc.) and most importantly the requisite action plan that is oriented on mitigating and neutralizing the threat. The arbitrary implementation of conventional zones associated with hazardous materials events at a complex attack would likely prove not only insufficient, but counterproductive. Zones, control measures and boundaries must not only account for threat, associated hazards and anticipated tactical actions across lateral terrain, but also in vertical context.